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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE* 
TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank based in 
Washington, D.C. It is dedicated to promoting technological progress that 
improves the human condition. It seeks to advance public policy that 
makes experimentation, entrepreneurship, and investment possible. 
TechFreedom has closely studied recent state laws that attempt to 
regulate social media. Its experts have written and spoken extensively 
on those laws’ constitutional infirmities, as well as on why those 
infirmities cannot be fixed by a “common carriage” theory. See, e.g., 
Corbin K. Barthold & Berin Szóka, No, Florida Can’t Regulate Online 
Speech, Lawfare, https://bit.ly/3iBFk0h (Mar. 12, 2021) (cited in this 
action’s complaint, Dkt 1 at 19 n.26); Corbin K. Barthold, Social Media 
and Common Carriage: Lessons From the Litigation Over Florida’s SB 
7072, WLF Legal Backgrounder, https://bit.ly/3FmvYzl (Sept. 24, 2021); 
UCLA School of Law, A Space for Everyone? Debating Online Platforms 
and Common Carriage Rules, YouTube, https://bit.ly/3Dfa3Ir (June 4, 
2021) (debate between TechFreedom President Berin Szóka and 
 
*  No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No one, apart 
from TechFreedom and its counsel, contributed money intended to fund 
the brief’s preparation or submission. All parties have consented to the 
brief’s being filed. 
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Professor Eugene Volokh); Berin Szóka & Corbin K. Barthold, Justice 
Thomas’s Misguided Concurrence on Platform Regulation, Lawfare, 
https://bit.ly/2YxGxPo (Apr. 14, 2021); Berin Szóka & Ari Cohn, It is Not 
the Government’s Job to Promote ‘Fairness’ Online, Salt Lake Tribune, 
https://bit.ly/3FjCjeR (Apr. 9, 2021); Corbin K. Barthold & Berin Szóka, 
Florida’s History of Challenging the First Amendment Shows DeSantis’ 
‘Tech Transparency’ Bill is Doomed, Miami Herald, http://hrld.us/ 
2ZPzqCf (Mar. 25, 2021). 
TechFreedom submits this brief to assist the Court in 
understanding the history of common carriage, its core elements, the case 
law surrounding it, what it meant at common law, what it has meant in 
telecommunications law, and, above all, why it is not a useful concept in 
a discussion of social media and the First Amendment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Promoting SB 7072 on Twitter last May, Governor Ron DeSantis 
announced that “Florida’s Big Tech Bill” will “level the playing field … 
on social media.” Ron DeSantis (@GovRonDeSantis), Twitter (May 24, 
2021), 8:45 AM, https://bit.ly/2ZW30qe. A month later, in the decision 
below, District Judge Hinkle offered the perfect response: “[L]eveling the 
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playing field—promoting speech on one side of an issue or restricting 
speech on the other—is not a legitimate state interest.” Dkt 13 at 27. 
Under the First Amendment, “a speaker has the autonomy to 
choose the content of his own message.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). This is, 
at bottom, a right to “editorial control and judgment” over the speech one 
hosts and disseminates. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974). See Appellees’ Response Brief (ARB) 22-25 (discussing Hurley and 
Miami Herald in greater detail). With its carriage mandates for political 
candidates and “journalistic enterprises,” its (impossible) “consistency” 
requirement, its notice and reporting rules, and more, SB 7072 roundly 
violates this right. 
SB 7072 is, in short, a First Amendment train wreck. Hence 
Florida’s attempt to insulate its new law from First Amendment scrutiny 
under the guise of “common carriage.” SB 7072 §1(6); Appellants’ 
Opening Brief (AOB) 34-39. But slapping the label “common carrier” on 
something doesn’t make it so. And even if it did, common carriers retain 
their First Amendment rights, and they have much broader discretion to 
refuse service than SB 7072 allows for. 
This brief addresses Florida’s “common carrier” theory as follows: 
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I. Social media websites—even large ones—are nothing like 
common carriers. Common carriage is about (1) carriage, i.e., 
transportation, (2) of uniform things, i.e., people, commodities, or parcels 
of private information, (3) in a manner that is common, 
i.e., indiscriminate. When regulating telecommunications common 
carriers, the FCC has adhered to these points. Social media, meanwhile, 
depart from them in all pertinent respects. Social media are (1) a diverse 
array of differentiated media products (microblogs, videochats, photo 
streams, and so on), (2) typically shared as a public-facing expressive 
activity, (3) that are subject to extensive terms of service. 
II.  Contrary to Florida’s claims, large social media websites display 
none of the indicia of traditional common carriage: 
 Such sites do not serve the public “indiscriminately.” Rather, 
they serve the public subject to various rules of conduct—rules 
that reflect the sites’ normative judgments about what 
expression they wish to foster or are willing to tolerate. 
 Even if the sites were “clothed” with a “public interest” (whatever 
that might mean), the Supreme Court—and at least one of the 
common carrier theory’s most notable proponents—don’t think a 
“public interest” test is useful for determining who can be treated 
as a common carrier.  
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 Social media websites do not possess “bottleneck” control over 
speech. In fact, the social media market remains highly fluid and 
competitive. And in any event, the concept of market power is 
not useful. Even an entity with substantial market power retains 
its First Amendment rights. 
 Social media websites have not enjoyed governmental support in 
any special or unique sense. They certainly have not received 
anything akin to the public easements that gave railroads and 
telegraph companies de facto geographic monopolies. 
III.  Three Supreme Court cases—PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006); and 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)—have 
been cited as support for the common carrier theory. These cases show, 
at most, that an entity can sometimes be required to host another’s 
speech if doing so does not “interfer[e]” with the host speaker’s “desired 
message.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64. The whole point of SB 7072, by 
contrast, is to “interfere” with social media websites’ “desired message.” 
What’s more, unlike the entities regulated in PruneYard, Rumsfeld, and 
Turner, social media websites function as editors, constantly making 
decisions about whether and how to allow, block, promote, demote, 
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remove, label, or otherwise respond to content. Curation and editing of 
expression are antithetical to the concept of common carriage. 
IV.  Even if social media websites were similar to common carriers, 
most, if not all, of SB 7072 would remain unconstitutional. In addition to 
the fact that common carriers are not stripped of their First Amendment 
rights, no common carrier has ever had to serve customers without 
regard to their behavior. Common carriers have always been entitled to 
refuse service, or bar entry, to anyone who misbehaves, disrupts the 
service, harasses other patrons, and so on. Because SB 7072 tries to force 
websites to serve even such people, it is not itself a proper common 
carriage regulation. 
Florida’s attempt to treat social media websites like common 
carriers is a dead end.  
ARGUMENT 
I. Social Media and Common Carriage Are Irreconcilable 
Concepts 
“A common carrier is generally defined as one who, by virtue of his 
calling and as a regular business, undertakes to transport persons or 
commodities from place to place, offering his services to such as may 
choose to employ him and pay his charges.” McCoy v. Pac. Spruce Corp., 
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1 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1924). As its name suggests, in other words, 
“common carriage” is about offering, to the public at large and on 
indiscriminate terms, to carry generic stuff from point A to point B. Social 
media websites fulfill none of these elements. 
A. Social Media Are Not “Carriage”: They Are Diverse 
and Evolving Products 
Lumber is lumber. Once it has arrived at a construction site, one 
two-by-four is generally as good as another. How the wood got to the site 
is, for purposes of the construction itself, irrelevant. Putting common 
carriage in its proper historical context begins with this fundamental 
point. The “business of common carriers” is, at its core, “the 
transportation of property.” German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 
389, 406 (1914); see Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, 379-80 (1887) 
(prohibiting a “common carrier” in “the transportation of passengers or 
property” from discriminating, by price, among its similarly situated 
customers) (emphasis added). 
True, the “transmission of intelligence” has sometimes been treated 
as “of cognate character” to traditional common carriage. German 
Alliance, 233 U.S. at 406-07. But that “cognate character” arose in fields, 
such as telegraphy and telephony, where information was treated as a 
commodity product to be purveyed through some sort of (typically scarce) 
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public thoroughfare. See id. at 426-27 (Lamar, J., dissenting). The key is 
that, like traditional common carriage, “they all ha[d] direct relation to 
the business or facilities of transportation” itself. Id. at 426 (emphasis 
added). Although it doubtless contains a message, a telegram is best 
thought of as a widget of private information conveyed along “public 
ways,” id., by a commodity carrier, see Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539, 
544-45 (1910) (applying the Interstate Commerce Act to telegraph and 
telephone companies). 
Social media websites are nothing like this. They are not 
interchangeable carriers of information widgets. The core aspect of their 
product, in fact, is not transportation at all. What the platforms offer is 
a wide array of differentiated—and rapidly evolving—forms of public-
facing communication. Twitter’s main product is a microblog. Instagram 
is primarily a photo-sharing service. TikTok is centered around short 
videos. Snapchat’s main feature is the evanescence of posts. Clubhouse 
focuses on providing oral chatrooms. Facebook embraces several of these 
other forms, and also fosters group pages. Far from simply transporting 
information from point A to point B, moreover, each of these services 
deploys proprietary algorithms to customize the order in which content 
appears on any given user’s feed. When it comes to social media, Marshall 
McLuhan was right: the medium is the message. 
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It is not true, as Florida claims (AOB 36), that SB 7072 fits an 
established “template” for “legislative designation” of certain “internet 
companies” as common carriers. To the contrary, the FCC has long 
confirmed that “data transport” is the essence of telecommunications 
common carrier service, whereas “any offering over the 
telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission 
service” is not. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to 
Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501, 11513, ¶ 25 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, because the bar for qualifying as “more than a basic transmission 
service” is low, even some services that, unlike social media, really do 
closely resemble pure information “transport” are, nonetheless, not 
common carriers. Although telephony, which connects users without any 
intervention by the carrier, is common carriage, even simple text 
messaging, which requires the carrier to undertake some information 
processing during transmission, is not. See In re Petitions for Decl’y 
Ruling on Reg’y Status of Wireless Messaging Serv., 33 FCC Rcd. 12075 
(2018). 
The social media market is diverse and fast-moving. Social media 
websites constantly create new forms of content. They compete in a 
market for differentiated media products. What they do not do is 
passively act as “carriers” of information. 
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B. Social Media Are Not “Carriage”: They Are 
Fundamentally Expressive  
Again, common carriage involves the transportation of people and 
commodities. Telegraphy and telephony press the boundaries of that 
core, transportational conception of common carriage. One message, after 
all, is not interchangeable with another. There is, however, a key sense 
in which a telegram or a telephone call is indeed just a widget of 
information: such communications are usually private. And being 
private, they are usually treated as strictly between the individual 
sender and recipient. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (criminal penalties for 
intercepting a wire or secretly recording a call). This means that a carrier 
may transmit a telegram or a call while remaining indifferent to its 
content. 
Once a “telephone company becomes a medium for public rather 
than private communication,” however, “the fit of traditional common 
carrier law becomes much less snug.” Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987). While 
transmitting a private call or message can be thought of as carrying an 
information widget, transmitting a public-facing call or message is 
clearly about broadcasting ideas and viewpoints. Id. It is a mode of 
expression, not only by the direct speaker, but also by the purveyor of the 
speech. “Mass-media speech,” in short, “implicates a broader range of free 
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speech values” than does “person-to-person” speech. Christopher S. Yoo, 
Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 697, 701 (2010). 
This is not to say that all private communications are common 
carriage. As we saw above, text messaging is not. Nor would an Internet-
based messaging service such as WhatsApp be. What is true, though, is 
that public communication is, virtually by definition, not common 
carriage. Indeed, Congress considered, and rejected, proposals to make 
broadcasting common carriage in the Radio Act of 1927, and it explicitly 
declared that broadcasting is not common carriage in the 
Communications Act of 1934. Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973); see 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). 
As the appellees explain (ARB 22-25), two of the key precedents 
governing this case are Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, and Hurley, 515 U.S. 
557. Miami Herald strikes down a Florida law that required a newspaper 
to print a political candidate’s reply to the newspaper’s unfavorable 
coverage. Hurley holds that a private parade may exclude some groups 
from participating. Like a newspaper (Miami Herald) or a parade 
(Hurley), a social media website presents a collection of messages to a 
wide audience. This public-facing expression is incompatible with—
indeed, contradictory to—the concept of common carriage. Calling the 
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websites “common carriers” anyway doesn’t make it so. The Florida 
legislature could not overturn Miami Herald or Hurley simply by 
declaring that newspapers or parades are “common carriers.” The same 
holds true here. 
“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced 
upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, 
the speaker’s [First Amendment] right to autonomy over the message is 
compromised.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. That is the overriding principle 
that SB 7072 flouts. “Common carriage” is not a magic label that can 
make this First Amendment violation go away. 
C. Social Media Are Not “Common”: They Are Not 
Offered Indiscriminately 
An edited product is, inherently, not common carriage. Although 
the FCC has waffled over whether most Internet service providers are 
common carriers, for instance, what’s clear is that if an Internet service 
provider explicitly “hold[s] itself out as providing something other than a 
neutral, indiscriminate pathway,” it is not a common carrier. U.S. 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Srinivasan, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). So long as it’s up front 
about what it’s doing, a provider that wants to engage in “editorial 
intervention”—and, thus, not common carriage—is free to do so. Id. 
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All prominent social media websites engage in such intervention. 
Twitter, for example, has rules that seek to “ensure all people can 
participate in the public conversation freely and safely.” Twitter, The 
Twitter Rules, https://bit.ly/3cpc75S (last accessed Nov. 9, 2021). 
“Violence, harassment and other similar types of behavior discourage” 
such conversation, and are therefore barred by Twitter’s rules. Id. Not 
surprisingly, bans on things like harassment and hate speech are 
common among online platforms. See Dkt 12 Ex. A ¶¶ 12-13 & n.27, Ex. 
C ¶ 11, Ex. D ¶¶ 8-12. 
What’s more, such bans have always been common. “You agree not 
to use the Web site,” Facebook’s terms of service said in 2005, to post “any 
content that we deem to be harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, 
vulgar, obscene, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise 
objectionable.” Wayback Machine, Facebook Terms of Use, https://bit. 
ly/3w1gYC5 (Nov. 26, 2005). Indeed, one can go back much farther than 
that. As early as 1990, Prodigy, one of the first social networks, made its 
curation function a central part of its marketing strategy. “‘We make no 
apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the 
millions of American families we aspire to serve,’” it declared. Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., 1995 WL 323710 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 24, 1995). “‘Certainly no responsible newspaper does less when it 
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chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the letters it prints, the 
degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.’” Id. 
That social media websites engage in curation and editing should 
come as no surprise, given that curation and editing are a fundamental 
aspect of the service those platforms exist to provide. Without 
intermediaries, the Internet would be a bewildering flood of disordered 
information. By organizing that information, intermediaries enable users 
to “sift through the ever-growing avalanche of desired content that 
appears on the Internet every day.” Yoo, supra, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 
701. Indeed, “social media” could not exist if intermediaries did not play 
this role. It is only because a platform engages in curation and editing 
that a mass of “social” media becomes navigable by the average user. 
More than that, such curation and editing is necessary to make social 
media a pleasant experience worth navigating. “[T]he editorial discretion 
that intermediaries exercise” enables users to avoid “unwanted speech” 
and “identify and access desired content.” Id. 
Florida contends (AOB 29-32) that such light editorial intervention 
doesn’t trigger full First Amendment protection; that websites must offer 
a “unified speech product” to avoid state interference with its editorial 
discretion. Wrong. Such a rule would be perverse, rewarding websites if 
they engage in more of the so-called “censorship” that Florida claims to 
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oppose. In any case, Hurley granted full First Amendment protection to 
a parade that combined “multifarious voices” and conveyed no 
“particularized” message. 515 U.S. at 569-70. 
Not only do platforms refuse to host content indiscriminately; they 
are widely expected not to do so. Although Florida won’t admit it (AOB 
25-26), everyone from advertisers to civil rights groups to the media holds 
the platforms responsible for the content they amplify, or even just host. 
See, e.g., Tom Maxwell, Twitch Streamers Demand the Platform ‘Do 
Better’ at Moderating Hate Speech, Input, https://bit.ly/ 37wIbSo (Aug. 
10, 2021); Analis Bailey, Premier League, English Soccer Announce 
Social Media Boycott in Response to Racist Abuse, USA Today, 
https://bit.ly/3xIpfdT (Apr. 24, 2021). An underlying assumption in the 
current furor over the Wall Street Journal’s “Facebook Files” coverage is 
that Facebook can, and should, intervene, extensively, in its own product 
to ensure that it is free, so far as possible, of toxic content. See The 
Facebook Files, Wall St. J., https://on.wsj.com/3GPgzYX (last accessed 
Nov. 2, 2021). 
II. Social Media Bear None of the Indicia of Common Carriage 
Florida argues that large social media websites meet some criteria 
widely exhibited by common carriers of the past, such as railroad and 
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telegraph companies. Even if these criteria had more than limited 
relevance to the rights of expressive entities (they don’t), social media 
websites meet none of the criteria at hand. 
A. “Serve the Public Indiscriminately” 
Common carriers, Florida correctly notes, hold themselves out as 
“serv[ing] the public indiscriminately.” AOB 35. “The businesses 
regulated” by SB 7072, the state then adds—now going astray—“hold 
themselves out as platforms that all the world may join.” Id. Although it 
might indeed be said that the websites welcome “all the world” to join, 
whether one gets to stay is contingent on one’s complying with the sites’ 
terms of service. Social media websites are not “indiscriminate” about 
hosting users who promote violence, engage in harassment, or spew hate 
speech. See Sec. I.C., supra. 
Even if the websites did hold themselves out as serving the public 
indiscriminately (they don’t), the “holding out” theory of common carriage 
is conspicuously hollow. A “holding out” standard is easy to evade. See 
Christopher Yoo, The First Amendment, Common Carriers, and Public 
Accommodations: Net Neutrality, Digital Platforms, and Privacy, 1 J. of 
Free Speech Law 463, 475 (2021). Say SB 7072 went into effect, and the 
websites responded by tightening their terms of service further, thereby 
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making even clearer that they do not serve the public at large. What 
then? Rather than admit how badly its law had backfired in its attempt 
to force the websites to host unwanted speech, Florida would probably 
declare that the websites are common carriers because the state has 
ordered them to serve the public at large. Such a declaration would 
confirm that the “holding out” theory is empty at best, and circular at 
worst. 
B. “Clothed” With a “Public Interest” 
Florida suggests that social media websites may be treated as 
common carriers because they are “clothed” with “a jus publicum.” 
AOB 35. Unsurprisingly, it doesn’t press the point. The Supreme Court 
has said that whether a business serves a “public interest” is “an 
unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed at [the 
business’s] practices or prices.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 
(1934). Even Justice Thomas—perhaps the common carrier theory’s most 
prominent champion—concedes that a “public interest” test for common 
carriage “is hardly helpful,” given that “most things can be described as 
‘of public interest.’” Biden v. Knight First Am. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223 
(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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C. “Market Power” 
Florida claims that large social media websites can be treated as 
common carriers because of their (purported) market power and 
(supposed) ability to control others’ speech. AOB 36-38. The first problem 
on this front is the brute legal fact that an entity does not forfeit its 
constitutional rights by succeeding in the market. The Supreme Court 
accepted that The Miami Herald enjoyed near-monopoly control over 
local news; yet the newspaper retained its First Amendment right to 
exercise editorial control and judgment as it saw fit. 418 U.S. at 250-52, 
256-58. 
This is not to say that media firms, social or otherwise, are above 
the antitrust laws. A newspaper that uses its market power to inflict 
economic pain on a rival—one that, say, convinces advertisers to boycott, 
and thereby bankrupt, a local radio station—is inviting antitrust liability 
for its business practices. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 
U.S. 143 (1951). It is to say, however, that the right to reject speech for 
expressive reasons travels with a company, like a shell on a turtle, 
wherever the company goes—even if the company, like Yertle, is king of 
the pond. Cf. Dr. Seuss, Yertle the Turtle and Other Stories (1958). 
In reality, however, the social media market is as lively as ever. It 
continues to offer many avenues of expression and communication. If 
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you’re convinced (as Gov. DeSantis and SB 7072’s other supporters 
explicitly are) that “Big Tech” is “out to get” Republicans, you can blog on 
Substack, post on Parler, Gettr, or Gab, message on Telegram or Discord, 
and watch and share videos on Rumble. And anyone who claims that 
network effects will ultimately thwart this competition must grapple 
with the astonishing rise of TikTok. 
As for the major players’ alleged “control” over speech, Facebook 
and Twitter are not, as Florida would have it, “like telegraph and 
telephone lines of the past.” AOB 37. The Internet is not “a ‘scarce’ 
expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity 
for communication of all kinds.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
Even the largest social media websites are just a piece of that “relatively 
unlimited” world of “communication.” As one (conservative) commentator 
recently put it, social media websites are “equivalent not to the telegraph 
line,” but to a few “of the telegraph line’s many customers.” Charles C.W. 
Cooke, No, Big Tech Firms Are Not Common Carriers, National Review 
Online, https://bit.ly/3hQMYDQ (Aug. 2, 2021). They are just a handful 
of “website[s] among billions.” Id. 
Consider an ongoing antitrust case against Facebook. Dismissing 
the FTC’s complaint, Judge Boasberg refused “to simply nod to the 
conventional wisdom that Facebook is a monopolist.” FTC v. Facebook, 
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1:20-cv-3590, Dkt 73 at 31 (D.D.C., June 28, 2021). The agency, the judge 
observed, had presented “almost nothing concrete on the key question of 
how much market power Facebook actually had, and still has, in a 
properly defined antitrust product market.” Id. In an amended pleading, 
moreover, the FTC now stands its case on an utterly implausible claim 
that Facebook’s only real competitor is Snapchat. Id. Dkt 82. The 
litigation is ongoing, and its outcome cannot be predicted. But if the FTC 
struggles to define a proper social-networking market (never mind show 
Facebook’s power within that market), all the greater is the task before 
anyone who, like Florida, makes the even bolder claim that large social 
media websites wield bottleneck control over online speech. 
D. “Recipients” of a “Publicly Conferred Benefit” 
“Section 230 helped clear the path for the development of [social 
media],” Florida claims, “as the government did generations ago when it 
used eminent domain to help establish railroads and telegraphs.” 
AOB 38. True enough, businesses that employ property acquired through 
eminent domain have sometimes had to operate as common carriers. It 
does not follow that Section 230, which broadly protects all websites for 
hosting speech that originates with others, creates a similar quid pro quo 
obligation. There are several problems with the comparison: 
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 Section 230 was not a gift to a few large social media websites 
(none of which existed when Section 230 was passed). It applies 
to every Internet website and service. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), 
(c)(2). If Section 230 doesn’t turn a blog, or Yelp, or a newspaper’s 
comments sections, or an individual social media account, into a 
common carrier, it’s unclear why it should turn Facebook, 
YouTube, or TikTok into one. 
 Section 230 simply ensures that the initial speaker is the one 
liable for speech that causes legally actionable harm. See id. 
§ 230(c)(1). It is not a “privilege” akin to when the government 
hands real property to one firm, to the exclusion of all potential 
competitors, for use as a railroad or a telegraph line. 
 Far from being a sign that the government wants social media 
websites to act as common carriers, Section 230 is a sign that it 
wants them to act as discerning editors. Section 230 ensures that 
a website can “exercise” a “publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content”—without (in most cases) worrying 
that doing so will trigger liability. Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 
327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 230 does not curtail websites’ 
First Amendment rights; it endorses them.  
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And if the federally enacted Section 230 is the quid, why should a 
state government get to impose the quo? The history of common carriage 
in the United States, going back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 
is one of aiding interstate commerce by setting and enforcing national 
standards. Precisely because they were regulated as common carriers, 
telegraph companies were not subject to regulation by the states. Postal 
Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27, 30 (1919). 
Even if Section 230 could serve as the basis for common carriage rules, it 
couldn’t serve as the basis for common carriage rules imposed by Florida. 
III. Supreme Court Case Law Does Not Save Florida’s Common 
Carrier Theory 
Three Supreme Court cases are sometimes cited as support for the 
notion that social media websites are “analogous” to common carriers. 
None of the three is pertinent. 
A. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
At issue in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980), was whether a shopping mall could be forced, under the California 
Constitution, to let students protest on its private property. Yes, 
PruneYard says, it could. In so saying, however, PruneYard distinguishes 
Miami Herald. That case involved “an intrusion into the function of 
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editors,” PruneYard notes—a “concern” that “obviously” was “not 
present” for the mall. Id. at 88. Here, by contrast, that concern obviously 
is present, as explained above. “Intru[ding]” into social media websites’ 
“function” as “editors” is what SB 7072 is all about. 
What’s more, PruneYard announces that “the views expressed by 
members of the public” on the mall’s property would “not likely be 
identified with that of the owner.” Id. at 87. Even if that evidence-free 
declaration was true, at the time, of the mall (we have our doubts), it is 
certainly not true today of social media websites. Florida’s claims to the 
contrary (AOB 27-29) notwithstanding, those sites are “identified” with 
the speech they host. A platform that hosts a certain speaker is widely 
considered to have deemed that speaker “worthy of presentation,” and 
“quite possibly of support as well.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
The mall also challenged the speech-hosting obligation under the 
Takings Clause. On its way to rejecting that challenge, PruneYard makes 
further findings pertinent to this case. The students, PruneYard notes, 
“were orderly,” and the mall remained free to impose “time, place, and 
manner regulations” on others’ speech that would “minimize any 
interference with its commercial functions.” 447 U.S. at 83-84. This 
makes PruneYard nothing like the case here, in which Florida seeks to 
make websites host hostile, abusive, highly disruptive speech. In effect, 
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SB 7072 requires the websites to host disorderly conduct, and it bars 
them from imposing reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. 
B. Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
In protest of the military’s “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, various law 
schools stopped allowing military recruiters on their campuses. Let the 
recruiters in, Congress responded, in a law known as the Solomon 
Amendment, or lose government funding. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 
(2006), rejects an association’s contention that the Solomon Amendment 
violates the First Amendment. 
Distinguishing Miami Herald and Hurley, FAIR concludes that 
“accommodating the military’s message d[id] not affect the law schools’ 
speech.” Id. at 63-64. Unlike “a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page 
of a newspaper,” FAIR explains, “a law school’s decision to allow 
recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.” Id. at 64. The 
pertinent distinction between job-recruitment meetings, on the one hand, 
and parades, newsletters, and newspapers, on the other, is—even though 
Florida, when discussing FAIR, ignores it (AOB 22-23)—not hard to 
divine. One-on-one recruitment meetings are akin to telegraphic or 
telephonic communication—the passage of private information widgets—
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and not at all like the public-facing expression of views undertaken by a 
parade, a publication, or a website. 
SB 7072 requires social media to platform various speakers, and to 
spread and amplify, far and wide, almost anything those speakers wish 
to say. It thus looks nothing like the law at issue in FAIR, a case about 
direct communication between a recruiter willing to talk and a law 
student willing to listen. For FAIR to resemble this case, Congress would 
have had to pass a law altogether different from the Solomon 
Amendment. Picture a law requiring law schools to let neo-Nazis maraud 
their halls toting signs and bullhorns. That is the equivalent of what 
SB 7072 requires of select social media websites. 
C. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC 
In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress imposed “so-called must-carry 
provisions” that “require[d] cable operators to carry the signals of a 
specified number of local broadcast television stations.” Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994). While concluding that cable 
operators engage in speech protected by the First Amendment, id. at 636, 
Turner subjects the must-carry provisions merely to intermediate, rather 
than to strict, scrutiny. Turner is brimming, however, with distinctions 
that render it inapplicable to social media websites. 
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First, like traditional common carriers, see German Alliance, 233 
U.S. at 426-27 (Lamar, J., dissenting), cable systems use “physical 
infrastructure”—“cable or optical fibers”—that require “public rights-of-
way and easements.” Id. at 627-28. This setup “gives the cable operator 
bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television 
programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.” Id. at 656. 
This means that “a cable operator, unlike speakers in other media,” can 
“silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.” 
Id. (emphasis added). On precisely this ground, Turner distinguishes 
Miami Herald, notwithstanding the fact that a “daily newspaper” may 
“enjoy monopoly status in a given locale.” Id. “A daily newspaper,” after 
all, “no matter how secure its local monopoly, does not possess the power 
to obstruct readers’ access to other competing publications.” Id. Just the 
same can be said of social media websites. Whatever the level of their 
market control—it’s not much, in our view, as we have explained—they 
do not, when “assert[ing] exclusive control over [their] own … copy,” 
thereby “prevent other[s]” from “distribut[ing]” competing products “to 
willing recipients.” Id. 
Second, “cable personnel” generally “do not review any of the 
material provided by cable networks,” and “cable systems have no 
conscious control over program services provided by others.” Id. at 629 
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(quoting Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of 
Expression, 1988 Duke L.J. 329, 339 (1988)). Cable operators are thus, 
“in essence,” simply “conduit[s] for the speech of others.” Id. They 
generally transmit speech “on a continuous and unedited basis to 
subscribers.” Id. This makes sense, given that most broadcast television 
content is comparatively sanitized and, certainly when compared to the 
worst online speech, uncontroversial. Turner concludes, therefore—again 
while distinguishing Miami Herald—that “no aspect of the must-carry 
provisions would cause a cable operator or cable programmer to conclude 
that ‘the safe course is to avoid controversy,’ and by so doing diminish the 
free flow of information and ideas.” Id. at 656 (quoting Miami Herald, 
418 U.S. at 257). This is the precise opposite of the situation with social 
media websites. The websites are not simply “conduits”; they are 
provided on a curated and edited basis, and they do sometimes take “the 
safe course” and “avoid controversy.” Witness, for instance, Twitter’s 
decision to stop hosting political advertisements. See Wash. Post v. 
McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 517 n.4 (4th Cir. 2019). 
Third, and relatedly, Turner declares—again while distinguishing 
Miami Herald (and it could have added Hurley to boot)—that there was 
“little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations 
carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable 
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operator.” Id. at 655. This, again, because of the cable operators’ “long 
history of serving” merely “as a conduit for broadcast signals.” Id. The 
cable operators did not even contest this point; they did “not suggest” that 
“must-carry” would “force” them “to alter their own messages to respond 
to the broadcast programming they [we]re required to carry.” Id. As we’ve 
explained, the “long history” behind social media could not be more 
different. Naturally, given that history, the platforms vigorously contend 
that they would have to “respond” to certain messages they might be 
required “to carry.” 
Fourth, the central issue in Turner was whether the must-carry 
provisions were content neutral. “Broadcasters, which transmit over the 
airwaves, are favored,” Turner acknowledges, “while cable programmers, 
which do not, are disfavored.” Id. at 645. But this distinction, Turner 
concludes, did not make the must-carry provisions a content-based law 
subject to strict scrutiny. According to Turner, “Congress’ overriding 
objective … was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter, 
viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free [broadcast] 
television programming.” Id. at 646. In other words, the law was purely 
about “economic incentive[s].” Id. at 646. The cable operators, for their 
part, did little to argue otherwise, raising only “speculati[ve]” 
“hypothes[es]” about “a content-based purpose” for the law. Id. at 652. 
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Here, by contrast, SB 7072 “is riddled with [content-based] distinctions.” 
Eric Goldman, Florida Hits a New Censorial Low in Internet Regulation 
(Comments on SB 7072), Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
https://bit.ly/2T8R5BC (June 3, 2021) (analyzing SB 7072’s “many 
discriminatory classifications”). 
IV. The Burdens Imposed by SB 7072 Go Far Beyond Common 
Carriage 
Florida’s law effectively compels large social media services to host 
all users, however obnoxious their behavior. This is not what common 
carriage meant at common law. “An innkeeper or common carrier has 
always been allowed to exclude drunks, criminals and diseased 
persons[.]” Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 280 (1963) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (citing Bruce Wyman, Public Service Corporations (1911), 
available at https://bit.ly/3wb5c84). “It is not the mere intoxication that 
disables the person from requiring service; it is the fact that he may be 
obnoxious to the others.” Wyman, supra, § 632. “Telegraph companies 
likewise need not accept obscene, blasphemous, profane or indecent 
messages.” Id. § 633. 
In short, common carriers enjoyed broad discretion to “restrain” and 
“prevent” “profaneness, indecency, [and] other breaches of decorum in 
speech or behavior.” Id. § 644. They were not even “bound to wait until 
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some act of violence, profaneness or other misconduct had been 
committed” before expelling those whom they suspected to be “evil-
disposed persons.” Id. 
True, there were limits. A telegraph company that refused to carry 
an “equivocal message”—one whose offensiveness was debatable—did so 
“at its peril.” Id. § 632. Although a telephone service could “cut off” a 
“habitually profane” subscriber, it had to show some tolerance to someone 
who “desisted from objectionable language upon complaint being made to 
him.” Id. And regulators could (and in some areas still can) assess 
whether certain of a common carrier’s rules and prohibitions are “just 
and reasonable.” See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a). But in general, the 
“principle of nondiscrimination does not preclude distinctions based on 
reasonable business classifications.” Carlin, 827 F.2d at 1293. Thus, a 
telephone company could refuse to carry all price advertising in its yellow 
pages directory (a common carrier service) even though this was an 
“explicit content-based restriction.” Id. 
Florida’s tactic of “labeling” SB 7072 a “common carrier scheme” 
has “no real First Amendment consequences.” ARB 42 (quoting Denver 
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 825 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
But although a common carrier’s First Amendment rights exist apart 
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from its common-law powers over patrons’ behavior, it still bears noting 
that, under those common-law rules, SB 7072 cannot qualify as a proper 
common-carriage law. Above all, a valid common-carriage regulation 
would not bar social media from setting reasonable rules governing 
“indecent messages.” Wyman, supra, § 633. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction should 
be affirmed. 
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